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Introduction

As the Supreme Court of the United States recently observed, the
legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but
that policy choice has been one made by the states in the absence of
Congressional action.1 The Supreme Court made this observation in the
context of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,2 a case in
which the Court held that the federal Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PASPA”) violated the anticommandeering provision of
the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.3 PASPA, as written,
prohibited state legislatures from enacting laws permitting stateauthorized sports wagering.4
This observation by the Court is consistent with what has been the
longstanding approach to gambling in the United States—specifically,
that the legalization of gambling in its various forms has been left to the
states. In determining that PASPA was unconstitutional, the Court
reiterated this principle—while noting that Congress could, if it chose,
regulate sports wagering directly.5
Congress has regulated gambling in other ways: by making
gambling related crimes that violate state law and have an element of
interstate travel violations of federal law,6 and by regulating payment
systems to require those systems to take steps to prohibit unlawful
internet gaming transactions.7 With these laws, the underlying conduct
giving rise to the federal regulation is conduct that is derivative of state
law. And this method is also consistent with the traditional deference
Congress has given to the states in allowing states to set their own policy
with respect to gambling. But one federal criminal statute from 1961
runs contrary to this general paradigm and, after being of little interest
for many years, has been the source of two Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) interpretations in the last decade and a high-profile case in the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.8 This statute, the
1

See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018).
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461.
3 Id. at 1478; 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq.
4 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478; 28 U.S.C.S. § 3701 et seq.
5 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1483-85.
6 See, e.g., Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952; Wagering Paraphernalia Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1953.
7 Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 536 et seq.
8 N.H. Lottery Comm. v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Reconsidering
Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non‐Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C., at *23, 2018 WL
7080165, at *14 (Nov. 2, 2018); Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non‐Sports Gambling,
35 Op. O.L.C. 134, 151 (2011).
2
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Interstate Wire Wager Act—known more commonly as the Wire Act—
operates outside of this normal paradigm under which Congress has
deferred to the states in setting gambling policy.9 As it exists today, the
Wire Act does not require an underlying violation of state law, and acts
to prohibit the transmission of sports bets across state lines even if
those bets are legal in the states where transmitted and received.10
This Article will review these two unusual federal statutes—PASPA
and the Wire Act—to examine the implications that arise when
Congress acts to regulate gambling activity that is otherwise permissible
under state law. In the PASPA case the Supreme Court determined that
the manner in which Congress chose to regulate was unconstitutional.11
In regards to the Wire Act, the DOJ’s attempt to interpret its provisions
to apply not only to sports betting, but to all forms of gaming—
regardless of its legality under state law—resulted in a significant
reexamination of the Wire Act, and a narrow construction.12 But the
Wire Act—enacted in 1961, long before online sports wagering was ever
contemplated—still imposes a limit on conduct otherwise permitted by
the states.13 This Article will compare and contrast the reasoning
behind PASPA and the Wire Act and will consider the implications of
each of these statutes on the future expansion of legalized gambling.

II.

Background: State Regulation of Gambling

State authorization of gambling—specifically lotteries—goes back
to the colonial era. In 1776, several lotteries operated in the colonies,
often being used to finance public works projects such as streets.14 But
following massive lottery scandals, most forms of gambling were
outlawed by the states beginning in the 1870s.15 The Constitution of
1844, in its text, specifically prohibited lotteries and the buying and
selling of lottery tickets in the state.16 In 1897, the Constitution was
amended, further prohibiting “pool-selling, book-making, or gambling
of any kind […]”17 But in 1939, the Constitution was amended to allow

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18 U.S.C. § 1084.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct.
42 Op. O.L.C., at *23, 2018 WL 7080165, at *14
18 U.S.C. § 1084.
National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report (1999), at 2-1.
Id.
N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § VII (1897).
Id.
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pari-mutuel wagering on horse races.18 The rewritten Constitution of
1947 continued this philosophy of restriction on gambling, stating
that,”[n]o gambling of any kind shall be authorized by the Legislature
unless the specific kind, restrictions, and control thereof” had been
approved in a referendum.19 This constitutional provision has been
amended several times, including to authorize casino gambling and
sports wagering.20
It was not until 1931 that Nevada—long known as the epicenter of
legalized gambling in the United States—authorized gambling on a
statewide basis.21 In 1945, the Nevada Tax Commission became the
regulatory body with oversight over the gaming industry, replaced by
the Gaming Control Board in 1955.22 Other states have followed suit in
authorizing particular forms of gaming, which are typically regulated by
state agencies.23 With few exceptions, the federal government has not
been involved in deciding what forms of gaming states may authorize or
how those states go about regulating gaming. The result has been a wide
variety of policy choices made by state governments—with some
choosing to authorize expansive forms of gaming, some more narrow
forms, some lotteries, and some authorizing virtually no gaming at all.

III.

PASPA: Congress Gets Involve In A Specific Form
of Gaming

PASPA was introduced in the United States Senate on February 22,
1991.24 Former professional athlete and then-Senator from New Jersey,
Bill Bradley, was one of the prime sponsors of the bill and testified in its
favor.25 Representatives of the major professional sports leagues also
testified in its favor, and the bill was ultimately passed and signed by the
President.26 Testimony in favor of the bill centered around the
perceived risks that legal sports wagering presented to the integrity of
18

N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, para. 2. (1939).
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, para. 2. (1947).
20 Id.
21 Robert D. Faiss & Gregory R. Gemignani, Nevada Gaming Statutes: Their Evolution
and History, CTR. FOR GAMING RESEARCH, Sept. 2011, at 1.
22 Id. at 2-3.
23 See, e.g., 4 Pa. C.S. 1202 (granting Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board sole
regulatory authority over conduct of gaming in Pennsylvania); La. R.S. 27:15 (same with
respect to Louisiana).
24 Amateur Sports Protection Act, S. 474, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3554 [hereinafter PASPA hearing].
25 Id.
26 Id.
19
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games.27 Then-NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue stated: “With
legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent the
fast buck, the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing.”28
Commissioner Tagliabue further stated that with wide legalization of
sports gambling would come suspicion about controversial plays and
beliefs that games were fixed whenever a team did not beat a point
spread.29
The Senate Judiciary Committee observed that in 1991, thirty-two
states had some form of gambling, and that many were considering the
possibility of sports betting.30 The Committee further went on to infer
that once one state legalized sports betting, it would be hard for other
states to resist, thereby resulting in an “irreversible momentum” in
favor of sports betting legalization.31
Senator Chuck Grassley, a member of the Judiciary Committee,
published a minority statement opposing PASPA.32 Senator Grassley
began by reiterating the principle that wagering has traditionally been
within the control of the states rather than the federal government.33
According to Senator Grassley, “[t]he Federal Government has never
sought to regulate purely intrastate wagering activities.”34 He also
commented that any concerns about the integrity of games could be
monitored and addressed by the states through their regulatory
systems.35 The DOJ also indicated that PASPA created significant
federalism concerns.36
Nevertheless, PASPA was enacted by Congress and signed by the
President. Interestingly, however, despite its stated legislative goals
PASPA did not actually prohibit sports wagering. Instead, it regulated
the conduct of the state:
It shall be unlawful for . . . a governmental entity to sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license or authorize by law or
compact . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling,
or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the
use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 3555.
Id.
Id. at 3556.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3556.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3556.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3562.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3562.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3563.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3566.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24, at 3563.
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competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more
performances of such athletes in such games.37
As discussed previously in the illustration of New Jersey state
constitutional law, gambling authorization is a function of state law.
Moreover, because of the historical fear of undue influence or
corruption permeating the gaming industry, gaming regulatory statutes
have as part of their purpose the need to impose strict state regulation
on the industry and its participants.38 The use of the terms “license” or
“authorize by law” in PASPA was, therefore, a direct effort by Congress
to prohibit the use of gaming regulatory structures—so clearly a part of
the regulatory powers exercised by states that have legalized gaming—
to regulate sports betting.
Another interesting aspect of PASPA was its “grandfathering” of
conduct that states had previously approved or engaged in. Cognizant
of the fact that Nevada’s casinos offered sports wagering and that
Delaware, Montana, and Oregon had offered sports betting through
their state lotteries, PASPA contained carve-outs. First, Section 3704
specifically provided that PASPA does not apply to “a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling or wagering scheme . . . to the
extent that the scheme was conducted by that State . . . at any time
during the period beginning January 1, 1976 and ending August 31,
1990.”39 The “conducted by that State” language clearly applied to state
lotteries, so the sports lottery games offered by Delaware, Montana, and
Oregon were “conducted” by the state by virtue of being lottery games.
Thus, here, PASPA evaluated conduct specifically engaged in by an arm
of the state and determined that conduct to be exempt from the overall
federal ban on state conduct set out in Section 3702. Second, PASPA
exempted “a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling or
wagering scheme . . . where . . . such scheme was authorized by a statute
as in effect on October 2, 1991” and actually offered pursuant to that
statute.40 This applied to sports betting in Nevada, which had been
statutorily authorized for many years and was offered under the
regulatory authority of the Nevada Gaming Commission and State
Gaming Control Board.41 Here, therefore, Congress specifically
permitted conduct authorized and regulated by a state to continue.
37
38
39
40
41

28 U.S.C. § 3702.
See, e.g., Casino Control Act, N.J.S.A. 5:12-1b.
28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(1).
28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(2).
N.R.S. 463.160.
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Finally, PASPA had a very unusual grandfathering provision—one
that essentially prospectively grandfathered conduct. PASPA allowed a
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme “conducted exclusively in
casinos located in a municipality” if that scheme was authorized within
one year after the enactment of PASPA.42 And if commercial casinos
were in operation in the municipality for a 10-year period prior to the
effective date of PASPA “pursuant to a comprehensive system of State
regulation authorized by that State’s constitution and applicable solely
to such municipality.”43 This legislative labyrinth only offered one
option: Atlantic City. In other words, PASPA allowed a single state to
prospectively use its state legislative authority to legislate its way out of
complying with a federal statute. Again, unusual. New Jersey did not
take advantage of the window and was thus subject to PASPA’s
prohibitions.
In a 2011 referendum the voters of New Jersey authorized an
amendment to the state Constitution that would allow the Legislature to
authorize sports wagering at casinos and racetracks; in 2012 the
Legislature did exactly that.44 The major professional sports leagues
promptly sued, arguing that New Jersey’s sports wagering law violated
PASPA.45 The state countered that PASPA was unconstitutional, but
both the District Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed.46 New Jersey then tried a different approach—rather than
“authorize,” as prohibited by PASPA, it partially repealed its criminal
prohibitions on sports wagering to the extent that those prohibitions
applied to bets placed at a racetrack or Atlantic City casino by persons
age 21 or older.47 The sports leagues again sued, asserting that this
partial repeal amounted to an “authorization” squarely prohibited by
PASPA, and, again, both the District Court and Third Circuit agreed.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and on May 14, 2018, determined
that PASPA was unconstitutional.49

42

28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(3).
28 U.S.C. 3704(a)(3).
44 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
45 Id.
46 NCAA v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551, 554 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2013).
47 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
48 NCAA v. Christie, 61 F.Supp.3d 488, 508 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.
2016).
49 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-5.
43
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A. ANTI-COMMANDEERING AND THE SUPREME COURT
PASPA’s awkward method of regulating the legislative function of
the state—rather than the underlying activity of sports betting itself—
proved to be its undoing. New Jersey argued, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that PASPA violates the “anticommandeering” principle of the
Tenth Amendment.50 “Conspicuously absent from the list of powers
given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the States.”51
The Court noted that the anticommandeering jurisprudence was
relatively recent, where in New York v. United States52 the Court held
unconstitutional a federal statute that required a state to either regulate
radioactive waste or “take title” to it.53 The Court concluded that this
was impermissible because Congress cannot “command a state
government to enact state regulation.”54 The New York Court added that
where a federal interest is strong enough for Congress to be involved it
must directly legislate rather than conscript state governments to do
so.55
The Court confronted a similar analytical situation in Printz v.
United States,56 where a federal statute required state and local law
enforcement officers to perform background checks under a gun control
law.57 The Printz court concluded that this system was unconstitutional
because the federal government may not command state officers to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.58 The Court
concluded that this applies to all state officers—not just policymakers.59
Applying these concepts to PASPA, the Court held that PAPSA
violated the anticommandeering principle.60 The issue the Court had to
confront and refine its jurisprudence on was whether an affirmative
command and a negative prohibition were the same concept,
analytically, for Tenth Amendment purposes. As the Court observed, no
party asserted that Congress could compel a state to enact legislation.61
But PASPA did not actually require states to do anything—its phrasing
is that “it shall be unlawful for a government agency to” and then lists
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1476.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 923.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475, 1485.
Id. at 1478.
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the prohibited acts.62 New York and Printz each involved situations
where Congress told the states they must do something, not that they
could not do something.63 But the Court concluded that there was no
functional distinction between these two concepts: “This distinction is
empty. It was a matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New
York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing
a prohibition. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct
orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”64 Finding no
distinction between affirmative commands and negative prohibitions
when state legislative powers are implicated, the Court concluded that
PASPA commandeered the states to maintain the illegality of conduct
that would otherwise be within the state’s power to regulate.65 “PASPA
regulate[s] state governments’ regulation of their citizens . . . The
Constitution gives Congress no such power.”66 The Court reiterated that
while sports betting legalization is an important policy choice, that
policy choice was one reserved to Congress if it chose to regulate
directly.67 Congress could not, however, command the state legislatures
to make a particular policy choice.68
B. PASPA AS AN EXERCISE OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER
STATE POLICY
One theme of the cases and of gaming law in general, as discussed
previously, is that decisions about gaming policy are traditionally left to
the states. The legislative history of PASPA indicates that Congress
believed federal regulation of sports betting was necessary despite the
fact that sports betting had been conducted in several states under state
regulation without incident for many years.69 Congress then made two
decisions: to restrict sports betting and to do so in a manner that
required the states to continue their bans on sports wagering. This
federal intrusion into an area traditionally reserved to the states was an
issue unto itself as it allowed some states to continue regulating
gambling activity while it excluded other states from making that same
policy choice. Worse, however, was the manner in which Congress
chose to regulate. Rather than regulate sports wagering itself, Congress
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

28 U.S.C.S. 3702 (LexisNexis 2021).
New York, 505 U.S. 144; Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id. at 1477-78.
Id. at 1485 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
PASPA hearing, supra note 24.
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decided to order the states in their capacity as sovereign entities to
carry out Congress’ legislative priority. The combination of the
intrusion into state policy and the awkward way in which Congress did
so led to PASPA’s undoing, and the restoration of the states’ authority to
regulate gaming policy.

IV.

The Wire Act: A Combination Of Federal
Regulation of State Policy, And A Vague Statute

Another unusual instance of federal regulation in the area of state
gaming policy came from recent controversies surrounding the Wire
Act.70 The Wire Act is a federal criminal statute arising out of the
Kennedy administration’s efforts to be more aggressive in combatting
organized crime.71 But a combination of statutory ambiguity and the
DOJ’s inconsistent interpretations of the statute has again led to
confusion over permissible state policy and to a judicial interpretation
that favors the rights of states to regulate their own gaming policy.
The Wire Act states:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or
wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.72
There are several federal criminal laws that relate to illegal
gambling. A common element among these laws is that they are
derivative of state gambling law. For example, the Travel Act prohibits
interstate travel related to “unlawful activity.”73 Unlawful activity is
defined, in part, as any gambling activity conducted in “violation of the

70

18 U.S.C. § 1084.
David Schwartz, Not Undertaking the Almost‐Impossible Task: The 1961 Wire Act’s
Development, Initial Applications, and Ultimate Purpose, Gaming Law Review and
Economics: Regulation, Compliance, and Policy, 14(7), 533, 534.
72 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1952
71
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laws of the State” in which the activity takes place.74 The Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act prohibits the
transportation across state lines of paraphernalia used for wagering,
unless that paraphernalia is used for the placing of wagers where the
form of gambling is legal under the laws of the affected state.75 The
Illegal Gambling Business Act makes it a federal crime to operate an
“illegal gambling business” across state lines, but defines such business
as one which operates in violation of the laws of a state in which it is
conducted.76
Notably absent from the Wire Act is any provision relating to state
law violations. Of course, in 1961, when Congress enacted the Wire Act,
the concept of interstate legal sports wagers or internet gaming was
beyond the scope of what the legislature contemplated; ostensibly, the
only gambling activity taking place across state line was illegal. Thus, it
does not seem that Congress would have had reason to consider carving
out conduct that is legal under the laws of multiple states where bets or
wagers pass between those states. Here, rather than affirmatively
commandeer the state legislatures, Congress was simply silent on an
area of traditional state regulatory policy. Once more states made the
decision to implement legal gaming—and to allow it over the internet—
Congress’ omission led to several conflicting interpretations and still
leads to a federal restriction on state gaming policy today
A. DOJ INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WIRE ACT’S APPLICABILITY TO STATE
REGULATED INTERNET GAMING
The Wire Act’s impact on legal state gaming activity did not become
an issue until states contemplated using the internet for gaming
transactions. In 2009 and 2010, the New York and Illinois Lotteries
approached the DOJ to ask whether the Wire Act affects their ability to
sell lottery tickets over the internet when using out of state payment
processors.77 In September 2011, the DOJ opined that the Wire Act does
not impede states’ abilities to do so.78

74

18 U.S.C. § 1952(b).
18 U.S.C. § 1953.
76 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
77 Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 35 Op. O.L.C. 134, 135
(2011) US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel Opinion, September 20, 2011
[hereinafter Seitz 2011 Op.].
78 Id.
75
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1. DOJ’s 2011 Opinion Clarifies The Wire Act In A Manner To
Give States Regulatory Authority
The DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) first noted that the DOJ’s
Criminal Division took the position that legal, intrastate lottery
transactions may in fact violate the Wire Act because, in the Criminal
Division’s view, the Wire Act applied to any form of gaming.79 The
Criminal Division, rather strikingly, also took the position that even if a
wagering transaction was initiated and received within the same state,
the interstate commerce element of a Wire Act violation could be
satisfied if the transaction crossed a state line at any point in the
process.80 The Criminal Division’s interpretation, therefore, meant that
a state could not use the internet for any gaming transaction—even one
the state itself engages in as the operator of a state lottery.81 Here,
therefore, the Criminal Division specifically stated that a state could not
conduct even a form of gaming authorized by the state. The Criminal
Division recognized the potential incongruity of applying a federal
statute to criminalize conduct that was clearly permitted under state
law.82
The OLC disagreed with the Criminal Division but did not delve far
into the nuance of whether the Wire Act was intended to, or did, apply
to state-authorized gaming activity.83 Instead, the OLC used statutory
construction to resolve the issue. It concluded that the “on any sporting
event or contest” modifier in the Wire Act applies to both the “bets or
wagers” and “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers”
clauses in the Wire Act, and, therefore, the Wire Act only applies to
prohibit passing sports bets or wagers across state lines.84 Of course,
this was before the implementation of sports wagering on a more
nationwide basis in 2018, and, thus, the OLC did not take a position on
whether sports betting authorized by a state would create an issue
under the Wire Act.
In reaching its conclusion that the Wire Act only applies to sports
wagering, the OLC opined that the more natural reading of the statutory
language was to apply the “on any sporting event or contest” language
to the “bets or wagers” provision.85 The OLC concluded that it made
little sense for Congress to have intended to prohibit all “bets or
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 137.
Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 140.
Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 140.
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wagers,” but only address “the transmission of information assisting
bets or wagers concerning sports[.]”86 Moreover, the OLC observed that
the legislative history of the Wire Act supported this conclusion.87 The
OLC noted that the Wire Act, as originally drafted, was written more
clearly before the introduction of subsequent amendments that made
the language less clear. Those amendments and did not have the
purpose of expanding the Act’s reach beyond bets or wagers on sporting
events.88 “The Wire Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress’s
overriding goal in the Act was to stop the use of wire communications
for sports gambling in particular.”89
The OLC observed that reading the statute to apply only to sports
wagering made the statute cohesive and applied its prohibitions to the
same conduct.90 “Reading [the statute]…to contain some provisions that
apply solely to sports-related gambling activities and other prohibitions
that apply to all gambling activities…would create a counterintuitive
patchwork of prohibitions.”91 As a result, the OLC concluded that the
Wire Act only prohibits sports wagering, and therefore does not apply
to lotteries that were legal under state law.92
While by its terms the Wire Act still applies to sports gambling, this
clarification greatly assisted in growing the sale of lottery tickets over
the internet and internet gaming.93 These state-regulated activities
were considered safe from violations of the Wire Act because of the
OLC’s clear guidance that the Wire Act did not apply at all to lotteries
and internet gaming. Moreover, gone was the concern about
“intermediate routing”—the concept of an inadvertent violation of
federal law if a wager passed across state lines in the course of it
traveling through information systems. This certainty contributed to
the growth of the sales of lottery tickets over the internet in addition to
the growth of online casino gaming, which began in New Jersey in 2013.

86

Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 140-44.
Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 141-43.
88 Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 141-42.
89 Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 141.
90 Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 141.
91 Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 144.
92 Seitz 2011 Op., supra note 77, at 151.
93 Howard Stutz, Online Lotteries Flourish After 2011 Change in Wire Act, available at
https://www.cdcgamingreports.com/commentaries/online-lotteries-flourish-after2011-change-in-wire-act/; Christine Reilly & Nathan Smith, Internet Gambling: An
Emerging Field of Research, National Center for Responsible Gaming, available at
https://www.icrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/white_papers/ncrg_wp_intern
etgambling_final.pdf.
87
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Moreover, this interpretation of the Wire Act contributed to the
2015 development of the Multi-State Internet Gaming Agreement, a
first-of-its-kind agreement among New Jersey, Nevada, and Delaware
whereby the states shared poker liquidity.94 The growth of online poker
presents unique challenges because an online poker game can only
proceed if there are a sufficient number of players logged in at the same
time willing to play at various stakes. Otherwise, joining players will
find no games available. In a small state, such as Delaware, this can be a
challenge, and thus, a strategy of sharing players among states has the
potential to expand the growth of online poker. With the Multi-State
Internet Gaming Agreement, states set their own gaming policies and
then coordinated those policies, and so were able to contribute to the
growth of the industry when the OLC removed this clouded
interpretation of federal law.
Additionally, as other states moved toward the development of
internet gaming, states looked for ways to make operations more
efficient from an online gaming perspective. Pennsylvania’s regulations
on internet gaming allowed operators to locate equipment outside of the
state, subject to certain restrictions.95
Given the amount of
infrastructure required to develop an online gaming system, sharing
those resources with locations in other states that already had it in
place—such as New Jersey—was a proactive way to help the industry
grow efficiently.
2. DOJ’s 2018 Opinion Reverses Its Prior Position And Throws
The Existing Industry Into Disarray
On November 2, 2018, the OLC issued a new opinion,
“Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports
Gambling.”96 After conceding that the OLC does not lightly depart from
its precedents, the OLC nevertheless receded from the 2011 Opinion and
concluded that the Wire Act applies to all forms of wagering.97 The 2018
Opinion came to the opposite conclusion of the 2011 Opinion and found
that the phrase “on any sporting event or contest” modifies only the
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See generally Multi‐State Internet Gaming Agreement, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR
1,
4,
5,
12
(Feb.
25,
2014),
available
at
https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/2017news/MSIGA%20signed%20by%20all.pdf.
95 58 PA. CODE § 809.3 (2016).
96 Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non‐Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C.
1,
1
(Nov.
2,
2018)
[hereinafter
2018
Op.],
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2018/12/20/201
8-11-02-wire-act.pdf.
97 Id. at 1.
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“information assisting on the placing of bets or wagers” language.98 The
OLC further concluded—again, completely opposite to its 2011
opinion—that the language of Section 1084(a) is clear and
unambiguous.99 Moreover, applying the “last antecedent” canon of
statutory construction, the OLC determined that the phrase “on any
sporting event or contest” can not be applied to the entire clause.100 In
addition, the OLC argued that Congress could have simply placed
commas in the statute if it wanted to make clear that the “on any
sporting event or contest” language applied throughout.101 The OLC
conceded that in 2011 it found that the Congressionally-intended result
“improbable,” but “improbable is not absurd.”102 The OLC also
addressed the obvious reliance that several parties, such as state
lotteries, placed on the 2011 Opinion.103 The OLC dismissed those
concerns, however, concluding that the plain language of the statute
outweighed any such reliance interests.104 The OLC added that Congress
could, if it chose, amend the Wire Act to clarify the scope of its reach.105
This change had the effect of immediately stopping Pennsylvania
casinos’ efforts to allow operators to take advantage of infrastructure
that was in place in other states.106 The Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Board, feeling constrained by the new Wire Act interpretation, directed
its licensees to reconsider their online gaming implementation plan.107
As a result of the new interpretation, the Board directed all licensees to
ensure that their operations were “entirely intrastate,” thus requiring
redesign and redundancy as a result of this shift in federal policy as
applied to legal, regulated state conduct.108
Seeking clarification, the New Hampshire Lottery—one of a
number of states offering online lottery games—sued the DOJ, seeking
to have the 2018 Opinion declared void.109 Both the District of New
98

Id. at 7.
Id.
100 Id. at 8.
101 Id. at 10.
102 2018 Op., supra note 96, at 15.
103 2018 Op., supra note 96, at 22-23.
104 2018 Op., supra note 96, at 22-23.
105 2018 Op., supra note 96, at 23.
106 Eric Ramsey, Regulators to Pennsylvania Online Gambling Operators: ‘Comply With
Wire
Act’,
Online
Poker
Report,
Jan.
18,
2019,
https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/34501/pa-online-gambling-wire-actcompliance/.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019), aff’d sub nom. N.
H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2021).
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Hampshire and the First Circuit agreed with New Hampshire and
invalidated the 2018 Opinion by way of declaratory judgment.110
In its analysis, the First Circuit noted that the Wire Act had been in
force for forty years before courts began to consider its applicability to
internet transactions. .111 The Court then analyzed the question that the
DOJ changed its mind on in its 2018 Opinion: how to apply the phrase
“on any sporting event or contest.”112 The Court discussed the canons
of statutory construction, finding that the results of applying two
different canons, unsurprisingly, could lead to two different results.113
The “last antecedent” rule, here, conflicts with the “series qualifier” rule,
leading to no definitive result. Under the “last antecedent” rule, where
a limiting clause modifies the noun immediately before it, the “on any
sporting event or contest” modifier would apply only to modify
“information assisting.”114 Under the “series qualifier” rule, where a
modifier can be read to apply to an entire series, it applies to the entire
series.115 Under that rule, therefore, the “on any sporting event or
contest” language applies to modify “bet or wager.”116 The Court also
concluded that looking to punctuation was not particularly helpful to
the analysis.117
The Court ultimately relied on finding “the most natural reading”
of the statute.118 The Court found that applying the “any sporting event
or contest” language solely to the “information assisting” prong leads to
an “unharmonious oddit[y]” that is avoided by reading the entire
prohibition to apply only to sporting events or contests.119 “If Clause
One is limited to sports betting…why in the world would Congress in the
very next clause outlaw telling the winning lottery participant that he is
entitled to payment?”120 The Court looked at the remainder of the
context and concluded that the OLC’s 2018 interpretation made little
logical sense.121 As a result, the Court affirmed the District Court’s entry
of a declaratory judgment voiding the 2018 Opinion.
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Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d; Rosen, 986 F.3d.
Rosen, 986 F.3d at 45.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
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Rosen, 986 F.3d at 55-56.
Id. at 58.
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Id. at 59.
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B. THE WIRE ACT’S IMPACT
The Wire Act’s impact on state-authorized gaming has been
twofold. First, the Wire Act’s prohibitions still apply to interstate sports
wagering, thus applying a federal policy from long before the birth of
online, state-regulated sports wagering to conduct that states wish to
regulate—and traditionally have regulated. That issue, today, acts as an
external regulatory constraint on state policy. Second, the DOJ’s
reversal created uncertainty, and its proposed reading in the 2018
Opinion would have had significant impacts on online gaming had it
been allowed to stand. Indeed, as discussed above, Pennsylvania set
specific policy regarding the location of online gaming equipment, only
to have to backpedal when the DOJ changed its interpretation of the
Wire Act and affected how the state could regulate online gaming.
Although the Wire Act is not a direct command to the states in their
capacity of sovereign entities, its—perhaps unintended consequences of
disallowing an exception for state-regulated conduct presents similar
policy concerns about its appropriateness as applied to state-regulated
conduct.

V.

Conclusion

PASPA and the Wire Act both had the effect of regulating, in
different ways, conduct that has traditionally been within the policy
competence of state legislatures. In both cases, the results of that
federal encroachment have led to significant curtailment of that federal
effort by the courts. In the case of PASPA, the Court set aside Congress’
entire attempt to prohibit states from authorizing sports wagering. In
the case of the Wire Act, dated language that, on its face, regulated stateauthorized conduct was read expansively by the federal government—
and was curtailed by the courts. While the question of the applicability
of the Wire Act to state-authorized conduct in the sports betting space
is yet to be addressed, one wonders whether a court would conclude
that when the policy implications underlying the Wire Act are
considered, a reading that the Act does not apply to state-authorized
conduct would be sensible. Concluding that the Wire Act does not apply
to state regulated conduct is particularly sensible when recent
reaffirmations by courts of the states’ authority to make decisions
regarding gambling policy is taken into account. Until then, however,
the Wire Act remains as a limitation on state governments’ authority to
set policy, should they choose the policy decision of sharing sports bets
across state lines.

